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A CALL FOR CHANGE: IMPROVING
JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS
JASON J. CZARNEZKI*
Abstract
Empirical data show that, despite the significant electoral success of
state court judges, elections still impact judicial decision making. Using
the State of Wisconsin as an example, this Essay suggests that Wisconsin
and other state legislatures, with the support of bar associations and
academics, should revisit the historical underpinnings of judicial elections
and consider both whether electing judges conforms with the historical
goals of having an elected judiciary and whether the available empirical
data support the belief that elected judges can be systematically consistent
and independent in the decision making process.
In evaluating state judicial selection methods, scholars, judges,
legislators, and lawyers must consider empirical evidence, normative
arguments, and democratic concerns. However, we must also consider
the historical context of state judicial selection methods. In other words,
why did a state choose an elective system, and does recent empirical
data support that historical choice? The State of Wisconsin serves as an
excellent example. In 2005, nearly forty Wisconsin judges stood for re-
election, over eighty percent unopposed,1 but do these non-partisan
elections promote judicial independence? Historically, two reasons for
electing judges in Wisconsin were that elected judges would be less
politically motivated than appointed judges and that such elections
would help further participatory democracy. However, the data suggest
that these 150-year-old empirical assumptions have proven incorrect,
and perhaps Wisconsin, and other states, should open up a dialogue to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; A.B., J.D. University
of Chicago. I wish to thank Dan Blinka, William Ford, and Andrea Voyer for their helpful
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1. WISCONSIN STATE ELECTIONS BOARD, CANDIDATES REGISTERED BY OFFICE,
SPRING GENERAL ELECTION - 04/05/2005, http://elections.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=13-
47&locid=47.
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re-evaluate their systems of judicial selection
At the time Wisconsin became a state, scholars, citizens, and the
popular press debated whether electing judges would affect judicial
decisions. While the question was first raised in 1846 by delegates of the
First Constitutional Convention,3 and again by the popular press from
1847 to 1848 during the Second Constitutional Convention, it has been
left unresolved for over 150 years. Competing prose in the nineteenth
century debated the pros and cons of judicial elections, but relying only
on political theory and assumptions, not empirical evidence. In these
circumstances, Wisconsin and other state legislatures, with the support
of bar associations and academics, should revisit the historical
underpinnings of judicial elections, and consider both whether electing
judges conforms with the historical goals of having an elected judiciary
and whether the available empirical data support the belief that elected
judges can be systematically consistent and independent in the decision
making process. Such an analysis will support the conclusion that court
systems should be based on a system of appointments, not elections. As
a more modest alternative, further safeguards should be instituted to
insure greater judicial independence.
An elected judiciary is certainly consistent with Wisconsin's
Jacksonian tradition of promoting public participation in government
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices are elected to ten-year terms in
statewide, non-partisan, April elections, and vacancies are filled by
gubernatorial appointment with the appointee expected to stand for
election to a full ten-year term the following spring (unless another
2. I am certainly not the first to suggest that states should consider changing or
modifying their judicial selection procedures. Yet, despite much literature and groups
seeking reform, see, e.g., American Judicature Society, Merit Selection: The Best Way to
Choose a Judge, http://www.ajs.org/js/ms-descrip.pdf (last visited July 15, 2005), most
attempts to adopt alternative appointed systems have been unsuccessful. Perhaps combining
historical perspectives with empirical claims will prove beneficial.
3. See JOSEPH A. RANNEY, TRUSTING NOTHING TO PROVIDENCE: A HISTORY OF
WISCONSIN'S LEGAL SYSTEM 52-53 (1999).
4. See, e.g., Constitutional Principles: V The Judiciary, WIS. ARGUS (Madison, Wis.),
June 27, 1847 [hereinafter Constitutional Principles], reprinted in THE ATTAINMENT OF
STATEHOOD 34 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 1928); Virtues on the Constitution, PATRIOT (Prairie Du
Chien, Wis.), June 22, 1847 [hereinafter Virtues on the Constitution], reprinted in THE
ATTAINMENT OF STATEHOOD, at 114.
5. See Nathan S. Heffernan (Chief Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court (1983-1995);
Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court (1964-1983)), Judicial Responsibility, Judicial
Independence and the Election of Judges, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (1997) ("Wisconsin,
admitted in 1848, became a state at the high tide of Jacksonian democracy.").
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supreme court seat will be contested).6 Judges on the courts of appeals
and the circuit courts are also elected to shorter six-year terms of
service.
The constitutional drafters of Wisconsin felt such elections would
not hamper judicial independence because judges would be elected by
diverse citizens from large geographic areas with little political stake in
the results.8  This is a key point. These drafters did not want an
appointment system because they worried that, unlike citizens (who
presumably would pick the most qualified jurists), the governor or
legislature would be biased in making appointments leading to a
judiciary with a lack of independence.9 In addition, gubernatorial or
legislative appointment was inconsistent with the Jacksonian ideal of
popular sovereignty, and, thus, Wisconsin became the second state to
require that all judges be elected by the people."
Offering arguments steeped in political rhetoric, supporters and
detractors split over whether this elective system would foster or impede
judicial independence and objectivity. Those few constitutional
delegates opposed to an elected judiciary thought that judges would be
chosen based on political party affiliation rather than legal ability and
would craft their opinions to fit with public opinion." The many
supporters of the elective system, however, dismissed concerns of
judicial politicization and a loss of independence because of their faith
in the electorateY.
Like a small minority at the Constitutional Convention, Wisconsin's
popular press and the framers of the United States Constitution were
not optimistic that judicial elections could insure judicial independence.
The framers of the Federal Constitution thought elections created too
great a desire or pressure to consult public opinion, especially in light of
the fact that many citizens are not trained in law.13 If popular elections
were used, "there would be too great a disposition to consult
6. WIS. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4, 9.
7. Id. §§ 5,7.
8. Journal and Debates of the Wisconsin State Constitutional Convention 1847-1848, Jan.
20, 1848, reprinted in THE ATTAINMENT OF STATEHOOD, supra note 4, at 652.
9. See id. at 214.
10. RANNEY, supra note 3, at 52.
11. Id. at 52-53.
12. Virtues on the Constitution, supra note 4, at 114 (describing elections as "a decided
improvement upon the formation of the judiciary and an increased confidence in the acts of
the people").
13. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
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popularity," and "[p]eriodical appointments, however regulated, or by
whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to [the courts']
necessary independence. ,14 The press in Wisconsin was more practical
in describing its concern, simply wondering how, if one elects judges,
one can expect anything other than that the popular vote will influence
the decisions of a judge, and if not, the reasoning went, there is nothing
to be gained by the electoral system. 5 While few have claimed that the
electorate has failed by electing obvious partisans or unqualified
candidates, where Wisconsin's constitutional drafters truly erred in their
analysis and in preferring an electoral system was in failing to
understand the practical effects of election itself on judges.
Thus, two major claims can be made. First, in light of Wisconsin's
history and tradition as just briefly described, the early founders would
not have wanted judges to exhibit changes in voting behavior in light of
past or upcoming elections. Second, modern empirical studies of elected
judiciaries strongly suggest that facing election does influence voting
behavior-an effect that would have been a concern to the founders and
should be a concern of modern-day lawyers, judges, politicians, and
citizens.
Appointed judges, who are more independent from the electoral
process, demonstrate a type of consistency in decision making not
exhibited by elected judges. 16 Elected judges, on the other hand, are far
more sporadic in their voting patterns as a result of both pending and
past electoral experience. 7 Elected judges fail to exhibit judicial
consistency as their arguably irrational fear of losing grows. While
judges may fear losing re-election, this rarely happens, and it is
especially rare for a sitting state supreme court justice to lose. 8 The last
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 105 (Alexander Hamilton) (1970).
15 Constitutional Principles, supra note 4, at 34-35.
16. Even if one is not convinced that appointed judges are more consistent and
independent, appointment systems at least foster an appearance of independence and
impartial judging. See Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific
Literature, 106 DICK. L. REV. 729, 744-45 (2002), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/LitReview-
.pdf.
17 See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
18. See Michael E. Solimine, The False Promise of Judicial Elections in Ohio, 30 CAP. U.
L. REV. 559, 561, 567 (2002) ("When incumbents [on the Ohio Supreme Court] are
challenged, they have a high success rate of 80% or more."); Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial
Selection Methods: Judicial Independence and Popular Democracy, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 65,
81 (2001) (citing Pamela Karlen, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
535, 543 (1990)) ("[M]ost judicial incumbents are re-elected without opposition."). See also
infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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incumbent Wisconsin justice to lose an election (and the only chief
justice to be unsuccessful in an election bid) was Chief Justice George
R. Currie in 1967.19 Wisconsin's lower court judges also are likely to be
re-elected. For example, in the judicial elections of spring 1999, nearly
ninety percent of sitting circuit court judges ran unopposed (twenty-five
of twenty-eight), and the three incumbents who had to defend their
seats all prevailed." This year, none of the fourteen Milwaukee County
circuit judge elections, including an open seat, were competitive races.2
Paradoxically, despite the high likelihood of electoral success, judges
nevertheless succumb to electoral pressures due to unfounded concerns
of losing re-election. Similar pressures are felt by other elected officials.
For example, members of Congress also exhibit irrational fears of losing
re-election. Despite the fact that incumbents typically win by
comfortable margins, they focus disproportionately on the occasions of
an incumbent losing a supposedly "safe" congressional seat.22
Judges seem likely to exhibit their most true voting preferences
when few adverse consequences will arise as a result of their votes. For
judges, this usually occurs when they are not up for re-election in the
near future or are not required to be elected at all. (This is not to say
that there are not other concerns such as legislative reversal or possible
impeachment for serious ethical violations.) If judges are experts in the
law and if one can reasonably assume that their true voting preferences
(or what they believe to be the best legal outcomes) reveal themselves
when judges are not facing election, perhaps judicial selection systems
should strive to limit the electoral effects on judicial voting patterns.
The alternative will result in undesirable consequences-adverse effects
on unpopular litigants and inconsistencies in judicial voting patterns.
For example, judges in some other states hand out death penalty
sentences far more often when they are up for re-election.' A strong
relationship has been observed between election years for judges and
the likelihood that a defendant will get the death sentence.24 It is
19. See George R. Currie, http://www.wicourts.gov/about/judges/supreme/retired/currie.-
htm (last visited July 15, 2005).
20. Joseph D. Kearney & Howard B. Eisenberg, The Print Media and Judicial Elections:
Some Case Studies From Wisconsin, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 593,731-46 (2002).
21. Derrick Nunnally, Races for Circuit Judge Draw No Competition, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Jan. 11, 2005, at, 2B.
22. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 61 (1990).
23. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
24. See Richard R.W. Brooks & Stephen Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The
Uneasy Relationship Between Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
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sometimes true that judges are "soft" on criminals when not worrying
about re-election and then ramp up sentences to the "optimal" level of
punishment when elections are near. But it is more common that
judges, like members of Congress, are influenced by an exaggerated
concern about re-election prospects. While Wisconsin does not have the
death penalty, it should be of concern if criminals, even those who have
committed terrible crimes such as murder and rape, receive
disproportionately higher sentences simply because the trial judges are
worried about upcoming elections. 5
While little research has been done on Wisconsin's trial courts,
analysis of the Wisconsin Supreme Court suggests that justices are less
likely to protect defendant and prisoner rights once justices have
experienced elective politics compared to the time period following a
gubernatorial appointment. 6 In looking at Wisconsin Supreme Court
criminal cases from 1986-2001, justices appointed by the governor were
fifty percent more likely to vote for a criminal defendant's claim than
they would be in later elected terms, or if they had been elected to their
first term."7 On the other hand, those justices who immediately faced
electoral pressures and were elected in the first term are sixty percent
more likely to vote against a defendant's claim in the first term.28 These
findings complement research done on other state courts suggesting that
judges vote strategically by conforming with public opinion and
refraining from dissent if they have to run for election or if they have
won election by a narrow vote margin in the past.29
The concern of a judge is not necessarily that he or she may violate
public opinion, but more precisely, that someone will draw attention to
a specific violation during an election. In other words, judicial
CRIMINOLOGY 609, 638 (2003). See also Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay
of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL.
1206 (1997); Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View
from the American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5 (1995).
25. Judges may become more punitive as election nears. See Gregory A. Huber &
Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When it Runs for Office?, 48
AM. J. POL. SCI. 247 (2004) (documenting a thirty percent increase in expected sentence
length from the first to the last day of a judge's term in Pennsylvania where judges serve ten-
year terms and stand in non-competitive retention elections).
26. See Jason J. Czarnezki, Voting and Electoral Politics in the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
87 MARQ. L. REV. 323 (2003).
27. Id. at 346.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme
Courts, 54 J. POL. 427 (1992). If a judge is up for re-election, there is little incentive to dissent
in the face of a strong majority block.
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independence is sacrificed because the cost of a controversial decision
may be to stir up a contestable and provocative issue for a future
opponent. Hence, changes in voting behavior are more likely in high
profile cases. In addition to facing difficulties in voting independently,
elected judges encounter additional pressures from political parties,
interest groups, and the media that make it more difficult to conform
with notions of judicial ethics. Judges, when facing election, find
themselves more likely to be influenced by partisan interests or the
public, more likely to make extra-judicial statements, and certainly find
it more difficult to avoid the appearance of impropriety even if none has
taken place. 3°
The evidence of judicial election effects centers mainly on criminal
cases because the public presumably pays little attention to the more
complex and less frequent cases such as copyright, antitrust, and
administrative law. Instead, the assumption is that the public generally
pays attention to only a few high profile criminal cases or criminal
issues. The limited evidence available seems to support this conclusion.
California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird's 1986 electoral
defeat can be attributed to her resolute opposition to the death penalty
and overturning a series of death sentences.31 In 1999, Wisconsin's Chief
Justice Shirley Abrahamson's sole dissent in a sexual predator case was
used against her in the election campaign, and the advertisement
implied that the chief justice's presence on the court would allow sexual
predators to prey on children. 2 Thus, even in the absence of evidence
about other types of cases, the election effects on criminal cases is
sufficient to switch to a different selection method.
It is true that electing judges provides for more direct accountability
and that any appointment process is certainly not devoid of political
maneuvering. However, for an institution dependent on precedent and
evenhandedness, it is of great concern if there is any inconsistency in
deciding cases on the basis of opinion polls. Even if appointed judges
base their decisions on ideological and policy preferences much of the
30. See John D. Fabian, The Paradox of Elected Judges: Tension in the American Judicial
System, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155 (2001).
31. See generally John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial
Accountability in California, 70 JUDICATURE 81 (1986); John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The
Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial
Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987).
32. Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973,
986 (2001). See also Kearney & Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 650 (revealing the considerable
extent to which news articles reported about campaign events in which issues related to crime
were raised).
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time, as many scholars suggest, 3 at least these outcomes provide for
some measure of consistency and predictability. In other words, even if
there are also disadvantages to any appointment system, it is still the
stronger method.
Depending on personal politics and the case at hand, one might
prefer an appointed judge or an elected judge. But only appointed
judges have an institutional safety net to prevent flip-flopping in the face
of electoral pressures. Life tenure or a lack of electoral accountability
for a substantial period of time no doubt permits appointed judges to
deal with some issues better left to legislatures (e.g., those areas where
various state experimentation might lead to valuable evidence of success
and failure). This is a necessary evil as there is little evidence to support
any contention that elected judges will better protect minority
viewpoints or promote the general enrichment of the less fortunate if
doing so will adversely affect their chances-or perceived chances-of
re-election (though some judges may not do so whether they are
appointed or elected). In this manner, the empirical evidence (including
the judges' own voting records) stands in stark contrast to the views of
elected judges and justices, including the views of Wisconsin's chief
justice, that judicial elections are beneficial to democracy, that elected
judges do not consider public opinion, and that even if judges wanted to
consider public opinion, they would be unsuccessful in correctly
determining the notorious cases.34 While judicial elections promote
participatory democracy, the data show that elections do impact judicial
voting patterns. At no point in Wisconsin's history has it been suggested
that it is beneficial to democracy for judges to take into consideration
public opinion in deciding a case. If this is in fact a perceived advantage
of the elective system, then no changes to it need to be made.
Based on the traditional view that judges should be independent
decision makers and the available empirical evidence suggesting that
elected judges change their voting patterns in the face of election, judges
at all levels of state court systems, like the federal system, should be
33 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). However, the appropriate conditions must
exist for policy preferences to trump. Judges are able to further their policy goals when they
"lack electoral or political accountability, have no ambition for higher office, and comprise a
court of last resort that controls its own caseload." Id. at 92.
34. See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 32, at 973; Judge Peter Olszewski, Sr.
(Pennsylvania Superior Court), Who's Judging Whom? Why Popular Elections are Preferable
to Merit Selection Systems, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2004). See also Heffernan, supra note 5,
at 1033 (arguing that the elective system should not be discarded, and instead a reasonable
system of public financing should be established).
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appointed. Because any judicial selection method can affect the
decision process, any change from the electoral system would require
careful consideration of whether to adopt a plan of gubernatorial
appointment, legislative appointment, or a "merit plan" where the
governor would appoint judges from a list of nominees submitted by an
independent judicial-nominating commission.35
In the alternative, there may be tools to be explored by individual
states to offset the negatives of an elected judiciary. For example, does
Wisconsin effectively limit the electoral influence in individual cases of
its highest court by electing no more than one justice per year and
having long terms of service? Even if individual justices would,
consciously or subconsciously, consider the views (perceived or
otherwise) of the electorate, the judicial election provisions in Wisconsin
may not allow electoral influences to have a significant impact on the
voting outcomes of the court as a whole. These safeguards minimize the
effect of any one given justice who faces re-election in the next year on
the voting outcome in any given year. What remains unclear is whether
these safeguards alone are sufficient to minimize the shifting of the
majority voting block in election years. In any case, the elections of the
lower court judges lack these safeguards-elections may take place
more frequently and judges have shorter term lengths. Other
safeguards might include further campaign finance reform for judicial
elections,36 still longer terms, and mandatory recusal in certain cases. In
fact, the early opposition to judicial elections in Wisconsin received a
slight increase in the length of judicial terms as its only concession.31
35. For a discussion of the various approaches, see Peter D. Webster, Selection and
Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1995); DANIEL
R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATE SUPREME COURT
POLICY (1995). Which of these appointment systems is preferable is not the subject or aim of
this short piece.
36. Many states have considered tempering the effects of the judicial selection process
on judicial decision making by implementing campaign finance reform for judicial elections.
See, e.g., North Carolina's Judicial Campaign Reform Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
163.278.61-.70, 163.278.13, 105-41, 105-19.2, 163-321 - 323 (West 2003), available at
http://www.ncjudges.org/citizens/education/about_.jcra/full-text.php (last visited July 15, 2005)
(setting up fundraising and spending limits, and intending to create full public funding for
appellate court elections in North Carolina). For information on other state initiatives, see
American Bar Association, Commission on Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns, available
at http://www.abanet.org/judind/jud-campaign.html (last visited July 15, 2005). In Wisconsin,
public financing legislation known as the "Impartial Justice Bill" passed the State Senate in
2000, but stalled in the State Assembly. See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection
in Wisconsin: An Introduction, available at http://www.ajs.org/js/WI.htm (last visited July 15,
2005).
37. RANNEY, supra note 3, at 53.
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At present, no independent branch of government exists in
Wisconsin. Empirical data show that, despite significant electoral
success, elections still impact judicial decision making, and elected
judges are less consistent in their voting patterns than appointed judges.
In addition, if interest in judicial elections continues to wane and these
contests are not robust,38 Wisconsin no longer even benefits from the
participatory advantages of an elective system. Historically, judges were
elected in Wisconsin because the thought was that they would not be
politically motivated, and that elections would promote Jacksonian
democracy. The experience and evidence of 150 years have proven this
assumption incorrect, and, thus, Wisconsin should renew debates about
its judicial selection method. Perhaps others states should as well.
38. There is some historical disagreement among scholars as to whether interest in state
judicial elections has waned. Compare William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years
of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 347 (1987) (finding that
judicial retention elections are generally characterized by low voter turnout) and Kenyon N.
Griffin & Michael J. Horan, Merit Retention Elections: What Influences the Voters?, 63
JUDICATURE 78, 80 (1983) (noting that "[a] prominent characteristic of the 1978 judicial
retention elections was the rate of voter abstention or non-participation") with PHILIP L.
DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY (1980) (noting that low levels of citizen participation in judicial elections
are uncharacteristic in the United States). Increased scholarly attention and citizen activism
has been seen concerning financing of judicial election campaigns, but, at this point, I
remained unconvinced that the attention to campaign finance reform has resulted in
increased voter turnout in recent years. See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The
Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 290 (2002) (citing Lynn A. Marks & Ellen Mattleman Kaplan, Guest
Commentary: Appellate Judges Should Be Appointed, Not Elected, PA. L. WEEKLY, Dec. 8,
1997, at 4; Abrahamson, supra note 32, at 992) (noting that only three of ten registered voters
voted in Pennsylvania's 1997 judicial election and less than one in four Wisconsin voters
participate in judicial elections). See also Brian F. Schaffner et al., Terms Without Uniforms:
The Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local Elections, 54 POL. RES. Q. 7 (2001) (finding that
nonpartisan races decrease turnout); David Klein & Lawrence Baum, Ballot Information and
Voting Decisions in Judicial Elections, 54 POL. RES. 0. 709, 720 (2001) (finding that party
information would reduce abstention rates).
